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The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce is, in many ways, typically 
American and, at the same time, the idiosyncratic expression of an odd, poorly 
socialized polymath’s attempt to bring order to all knowledge.  Peirce was the major 
proponent of the philosophy of pragmatism, although two others – William James 
and John Dewey – are more likely to be credited in relation to it (Menand, 2001). 
Pragmatism’s emphases on actions and behaviors can be identified as themes that 
run through a particularly American contribution to many disciplines, including 
psychology (e. g., behaviorism, evidence-based treatments) and psychoanalysis 
(e. g., CPSG, interpersonal/relational theory) (Litowitz, 2011).  One could arguably 
expect that the philosophy that would emerge from a relatively new country, cre-
ated through the labors of emigrants needing to leave their troubled past behind, 
would be optimistic, action-oriented, and desirous of being judged by what they 
do in the here-and-now, not by their lineage.
Ironically, the best description of how Peirce differs from the more cel-
ebrated proponents of pragmatism – James and Dewey – was written by one of the 
fathers of logical positivism, A. J. Ayer (1968).  In his typically clear prose, Ayer wrote 
that Peirce’s pragmatism is built upon the twin principles of continuity and fal-
libility.  For Peirce, all knowledge is the result of acts of interpretation (by someone 
of something in some respect), which are themselves re-interpretations – on and 
on – that may or may not capture the continual flux of the external or corporeal 
world correctly.  His vast oeuvre, which is still being compiled by a small band of 
Peircean scholars and issued in periodic publications, can be seen as a working 
through of these principles so as to capture all branches of science (knowledge) 
in one unified system.1
Since we can never be sure that we have correctly captured reality, we must 
keep communicating and, through continuous dialogue within a community, we 
will get closer and closer to getting it right – this latter eschatological thrust being 
Peirce’s expression of American optimism.  On the one hand, his emphases on 
dialogue and communication connect Peirce to continental psychologists like 
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Ragnar Rommetveit and philosophers like Jürgen Habermas.  On the other hand, 
his semiotic has not found a large audience among writers abroad whose think-
ing has been dominated by Saussurean semiology (Umberto Eco being a notable 
exception). 
Even in his native country, Peirce has not enjoyed the influence that his 
theory deserves.  One reason, alluded to above, is the attraction of American (non-
Peircean) pragmatic philosophy toward dyadic theories: stimulus and behavioral 
response; mother and child interactions; ego’s mastery of and adaptation to its 
environment; and so forth.  Peirce’s insistence on irreducible triadic relations and, 
in particular, his concept of thirdness has been the most misunderstood and most 
often, ignored.  The complexity of his semiotic, with its cross-classifications, levels 
of interpretation and idiosyncratic terminology (e. g., interpretant), combined with 
the slowly published release of his complete writings, have kept Peirce an obscure 
prophet in his own land.
Consequently, one reason that Peirce has not been an influence on psycho-
analytic theories can be attributed to the simple fact that most theorists are not 
familiar enough with his work to use it or integrate it into their own.  Even psycho-
analysts with a background in philosophy tend to bring into psychoanalysis think-
ing from classical (e. g. Aristotle, Plato) or continental (e. g. Heidegger, Gadamer) 
philosophers.  It is, therefore, with interest and pleasure that I find attempts to 
integrate Peirce and psychoanalysis among colleagues in Switzerland, Saussure’s 
native land. 
Among those who do try to use Peircean concepts in their work, whether in 
psychoanalysis or in another discipline, the great failing is to focus on his logic of 
signs (wherein he defines icon, index and symbol) and then to interpret his exam-
ples as entities in the world, existing independent of any act of interpretation.  The 
tendency to create entities (objectification) out of concepts and processes that are 
continua can be found among psychoanalysts who write about the unconscious as 
an object in itself or as a location for other objectified entities, such as repressed 
thoughts or thing-representations (cf. Schafer, 1981).  Recently, some psychoana-
lysts have enlisted the concept of “the third” as a way to express an intersubjectivity 
that emerges between two inter-acting subjectivities – for example, between an 
analysand and her analyst during the course of treatment (Litowitz, 2014). 
The global shift within psychoanalysis from an exclusively intra-psychic 
discipline to include inter-personal (relational) perspectives – characterized as 
one-body versus two-body theories (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983) or field theories 
(Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 2013) – has generated more writing about what happens 
Journal für Psychoanalyse 55
50 Bonnie E. Litowitz
between the two interacting parties: how they come to mutual understandings or 
break through transference-countertransference impasses.  Winnicott’s develop-
mental concept of a potential space, has been used to write about a similar third 
space in treatment, neither patient nor analyst, where something new (insight or 
object relation) can come to be; and occasionally, Peirce’s concept of thirdness has 
been also cited in this context (Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 2004).  Unfortunately, 
given the broad and unified scope of Peirce’s philosophy, it does not lend itself to 
such lifting of a concept or two from the whole; and therefore, the results neither 
illuminate the underlying philosophy nor its application to psychoanalysis. 
From my perspective, understanding Peirce must begin where he begins, 
in the phenomenology of experience: the qualia (the potentiality of firstness) that 
exists in the world can become a component of a sign but only once we encounter 
it at a given moment (the singularity of secondness) and only if that encounter con-
tains a generality that transcends the individual moment (the law-like generality of 
thirdness).  Each type of sign in the popular triad of icon-index-symbol consists of 
qualia or materiality, an encounter or act of interpretation, and a transindividual 
meaning.2  However, for any given sign one or another component may be domi-
nant; and this leads to the complex cross-classifications that most writers ignore in 
favor of identifying a sign by one dominant feature alone.  Unfortunately, simplify-
ing Peirce’s semiotic leads to simplistic conclusions, for example: collapsing dreams 
and metaphors; or failing to distinguish among forms of symptomatic expression.
A second reason why Peirce’s philosophy has not been incorporated into 
psychoanalytic writing originates in Freud himself.  As monumental and astonish-
ing as his theories are, they necessarily suffer, as does any writing, from the limits of 
knowledge at the time of writing.  For example, today we know so much more about 
the brain than in Freud’s time, when the synapse and the reflex arc had just been 
described.  How might Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology” read if written 
today? (Both Gerald Edelman and Antonio Damasio claim to be picking up where 
Freud’s Project left off.)  Similarly, where Freud’s theorizing deals with representa-
tion – perception and memory – and with language, one finds his writing equally 
in need of reexamination.  Unfortunately, however, in our reverence for Freud’s 
contributions, more often than not, writers today try to use current knowledge to 
justify, rather than to interrogate, Freud’s conclusions.  Nowhere is this tendency 
more in evidence than in the persistence of Freud’s distinction between two types 
of thinking – primary and secondary processes.
It was in “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900) that Freud first introduced 
the idea that humans engage in two types of thinking, a distinction he needed in 
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order to explain the differences in how we think when we are awake and how our 
mind works during sleep, as evident in our dreams.3  Freud introduces this great 
work with the claim that, unlike the many authors cited in his literature review, he 
would provide a scientific theory of dreaming.  Having provided many examples of 
dreams and ultimately the description of dream processes (the “dreamwork”) in 
Chapter 6, Freud embarks in Chapter 7 to make good on his promise.  The science 
that he provides comes from the ideas he had sketched out earlier (but not pub-
lished) in the Project.  Thus, Freud explains the differences in dreaming and speak-
ing in terms of energy: bound and free; forces seeking discharge; counter-forces 
(repression, censorship) pushing back.  He then adds to this basic metapsychol-
ogy ideas about human development that were extrapolated from the Darwinian 
zeitgeist of his time.  The ontogeny-recapitulates-phylogeny argument of social 
Darwinism can be found throughout this great work, most directly justified in the 
key passage (in Chapter 7) where Freud collapses all three kinds of regression.  As 
a result, generations of psychoanalytic writers have continued to accept Freud’s 
extension of processes originally proposed to explain dream representation and 
interpretation – e. g., condensation, displacement, considerations of representabil-
ity – as valid descriptions of a type of thinking more generally, apart from dreaming. 
We now have evidence from disciplines that did not exist in 1900 that directly 
undermines Freud’s more general claim about thinking, while not disputing his 
insights about processes of dream construction that aid our work in dream inter-
pretation with patients.  Specifically, research studies in child development and 
developmental psycholinguistics provide a very different picture of how children 
think, calling into question Freud’s claim that their cognition is primary in either 
a logical or phylogenetic sense.  A comparison of the features that Freud ascribes 
to the dreamwork (e. g., condensation, displacement, considerations of represent-
ability) with findings from child research studies clearly demonstrates that Freud’s 
1900 proposal is untenable (Litowitz, 2007).  Furthermore, Freud’s insights about 
dream representation and interpretation, which remain one of his great contribu-
tions, are now better understood in terms of semiotic theories, which were also 
not available to him in 1900.4
Specifically, because of his goal to encompass the broadest range of dis-
ciplines, Peirce’s semiotic contains sufficient nuance and flexibility to describe 
the differences not only between the imagic representations in dreams (so-called 
primary process) and the auditory representations of speech (so-called second-
ary process), but also among the varied forms of expression one encounters with 
patients.  We need to understand how symptomatic expressions differ in order to 
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understand why some patients communicate with their bodies (psychosomatic 
disorders, narcissistic behavior disorders) while others are paralyzed by obsessive 
thoughts.  When a patient in the course of a treatment relates a dream, is a wish 
being expressed in images so as to circumvent repression (Freud) or is an inchoate 
idea first being experienced in images so that it can be expressed verbally within 
the therapeutic dialogue (Bion, Barrangers)? When a patient expresses resistance 
in treatment, what is the significance of her doing so by not coming to sessions 
versus her coming and being silent; between her being silent and filling the time 
with empty chatter? 
Freud understood that how an Oedipal conflict is expressed as a compro-
mise in a symptom has significance for diagnosing the nature of the patient’s psy-
chopathology (e. g., hysteria, obsessive neurosis, phobia, psychosis).  Since Freud, 
with their emphases on the pre-oedipal period, some psychoanalytic theories 
have raised the question whether developmental deficits (e. g., in attachment, 
object relations, mentalization) are also factors to be considered in understanding 
symptom formation, in formulating diagnoses, and in determining clinical tech-
nique.  These approaches require an understanding of how cognitive capacities 
for representation and interpretation develop and impact psychopathology, for 
which Freud’s 1900 speculations on primary and secondary processes are woe-
fully inadequate.  Unfortunately, although post-Freudian theories draw on aca-
demic research findings for understanding the developing brain/mind, they most 
often characterize the pre-oedipal period as pre-symbolic and pre-verbal, thereby 
ignoring the significance of semiotic mediation in all human mentation from the 
beginning of life. 
Thomas Sebeok’s equation of life and semiosis provided the impetus 
for the emergence of a new field of study that explores mediational exchanges 
between organisms and their environments, both at the macro and micro levels. 
Biosemiotics uses Peircean theory to create bridges across different biological sci-
ences, from microbiology to epigenetics, and to discuss their differences (Favareau, 
2009).  Among psychoanalysts, David Olds (2000), has also used Peircean categories 
to create a bridge between the neuroscience of brain and a psychoanalytic psy-
chology of mind.  A further question raised by Saller is: can Peircean theory also 
incorporate Freud’s theory of a dynamic unconscious?
Peirce and Freud agreed that the greater part of our thinking occurs uncon-
sciously; that is, outside our awareness, automatically.  As Edmund Leach wrote, 
Pavlov’s dog learned to interpret the bell (stimulus) as an index to food (reward) 
but thereafter reacted to it as if it were an automatic, immediate signal (like an 
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innate reflex) (1976, p. 23).  Leach noted that the results of much of our educa-
tion are similarly automatic or, as Peirce would say, “habits”.  But what about the 
particularly psychoanalytic meaning of unconscious as dynamically unconscious, 
which is neither originary (simply not yet conscious) nor automatic (no longer 
conscious because a habit)? 
The dynamic unconscious, in the Freudian sense, is the result of having 
engaged some defense (e. g., repression, dissociation, disavowal, projection, split-
ting) that has been mobilized by a motivational force – instincts, drives, affects, 
anxiety – which originates in the body.  Using the terminology from the physics of 
his day Freud created a metapsychology of energic forces and counterforces seeking 
homeostasis that post-Freudians have sought to replace with tension regulation, 
attachment patterns, cognitive neuroscience, non-linear dynamical systems, etc. 
These later proposed motivational sources are not confined to the dynamics within 
one individual’s body/mind (as was the case for Freud) but take into account the 
individual’s relationships to its surround (e. g., its object relations, attachment pat-
terns, socio-cultural context).  Therefore, there should be even more opportunities 
to find a place for semiotic theory in psychoanalytic discourses, beyond discussions 
of dreams and symptom formation. 
From my perspective, the benefits of incorporating semiotic theory into 
psychoanalytic thinking do not include replacing Freud’s original energic metapsy-
chological models with Peirce’s semiotic systems (Litowitz, 1991).  Rather, Peirce’s 
semiotic offers psychoanalysts a system to make nuanced distinctions about the 
data that we deal with in our work and try to explain with our theories: representa-
tions and interpretations.  Peirce’s theory explains that representing/interpreting 
is one continuous process, in a constant flux that never ends – i. e., the process 
of “being in thought” (as Peirce would say) is dynamic.  Further, as psychoanaly-
sis seeks to integrate findings from other sciences (e. g., developmental studies, 
neuroscience, the social sciences), Peirce’s system, which he elaborated precisely 
to differentiate one science from another, is even more important if we want to 
avoid reductionism.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Peirce’s philosophy 
of continuity and fallibility is critical for our clinical work that requires continual 
negotiations between self and other, and decisions about subjective and objective 
reality.  What better philosophy for a working psychoanalyst can there be than 
Peirce’s skeptical realism that argues for an acceptance of uncertainty and error? 
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Annotations
1 The Peirce Edition Project at IUPUI (Indiana University-Purdue University 
Indianapolis) has thus far published eight volumes of Peirce’s unedited and uncatalogued 
collected writings. (See also Essential Peirce, v. 1 & 2.)
2 Peirce’s secondness and thirdness can be captured in mediational terminology as 
an act of interpretation that imposes a digitalization (i. e. a binary choice) on analogical 
experience.  And from information theory we know that a binary choice is a difference that 
makes a difference in the context of a set of possible choices, as in Saussure’s description 
of language as a system of differences.  However, what is missing from such alternate ter-
minologies is Peirce’s firstness, which gives a sign its materiality and connects it to some-
thing outside the sign itself (cf. nominalism).
3 Prior to 1900, in Studies in Hysteria (1895), Breuer and Freud had written about 
two states of consciousness, which then became the two systems: uncns and (pre)cns. 
4 Freud’s knowledge of language was similarly limited by the philological and his-
torical linguistic theoretical perspectives of his time, which also led him to make claims 
(e. g., the antithetical meaning of primal words) that are not tenable.
